State and religion in a secular setting: The Turkish experience by Cizre-Sakallioǧlu Ü.
~ Pergamon 
History of European Ideas, Vol. 20, Nos. 4-6, pp. 751-757, 1995 
Copyright © 1995 Elsevier Science Ltd 
Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved 
0191-6599/95 $9.50 + 0.00 
S T A T E  A N D  R E L I G I O N  IN A S E C U L A R  S E T T I N G :  
T H E  T U R K I S H  E X P E R I E N C E  
0 M I T  CIZRE-SAKALLIO(~LU* 
The contention of this paper is that, throughout the republic, the single most 
important determiner of the role, relevance and importance of religion in politics 
has been the state rather than the initiative of the religious forces themselves. Put 
differently, it is how the state ~lite has acted and reacted towards religion which 
has structured the political options, venues and discourses open to political 
Islam, and the degree to which religion could pose a challenge to the secular basis 
of the regime. This determining role of the state, has in turn, been a historical 
product of the conditions surrounding the formation and the evolution of a 
'strong state" tradition by the Ottomans which was inherited by the young 
republic. In this sense, this paper upholds the perspective that how regimes are 
born set the parameters for subsequent developments, and that, in the Turkish 
case, there has been more of the element of 'continuity' than change with regard 
to the powerful role the state has played in its relationship with religion. In my 
opinion this aspect of continuity applies up to the point of writing the paper, 
despite the seeming change in the contours of the state-religion relationship after 
the 1980 coup, which, as will be argued, was also a result of the changing political 
conditions. 
There is no denying however, that the maintenance of a strong state tradition 
in religion has gone through different historical phases, each with different set of 
constraints. 
THE MONO-PARTY PERIOD: THE SOCIO--CULTURAL 
TRANSFORMATION PROJECT 
The mono-party period of the early republic which lasted from the inception of 
the regime in 1923 until the gradual spread of multi-party politics in 1946, was the 
immediate heir to not only many of the intellectual and institutional traditions of 
the Ottomans, but also to a structure of society and religion and to a model of 
state-society interaction which was responsible for a particular type of state 
hegemony over Islam. In order to discuss the Ottoman legacy with respect to this 
model of hegemony in the republic, let us only examine two relevant aspects of 
Ottoman statecraft. 
First, Islam occupied its due place both in the structuration of the central 
government and the society. This broad division between state and society is 
conceived to be mainly a cultural cleavage 2 between a 'centre' based on shari'a, 
and a 'periphery' where religion took the form of 'folk' Islam, depending on 
membership in local religious orders, sects, or cults. The Ottoman centre, from 
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the very beginning, managed to have complete control over both the high- 
ranking religious functionaries--the ulemanwithin the state apparatus, and 
over the folk Islam. The end result was that, although there is no doubt that Islam 
constituted part of state mechanism and legitimation, at the same time however, 
the shari'a based Ottoman state was never as Islamic as, for example, the present 
Iranian Islamic republic is, ideologically, structurally and policywise. The 
outstanding reason for this was the constraints of ruling a multi-religious empire. 
If the shari'a basis of the state had been overemphasised, this would have 
provoked the reactions of the non-Muslim religious communities, organised 
around the 'millet' system, and also of the minority Muslim sects, like the 
Ottoman Shi'ites, and would endanger the unity of the Empire. If, however, 
control over the practices and institutions of Muslim religion had been relaxed, 
that would again lead to disastrous consequences for the legitimacy of the centre. 
There was, in short, a real fear by the state of religion as a force capable of making 
or breaking the Empire. The preferred solution was to impose political and 
bureaucratic controls over a weakly organised religious hierarchy--the ulema. 
Second, since religiosity among the common people took a diversity of forms, 
the structure of religion on the periphery also facilitated its containment by the 
centre. Though reducing the impact of folk religion on the central 
administration, the fragmentation of religiosity did not however stop the 
periphery from rebelling against the series of secular reforms undertaken in the 
Empire beginning from the end of the eighteenth century, stretching into the 
Young Turk period in the first quarter of the twentieth. These reforms were 
initiated by the Ottoman state to counter the problems of decline and 
disintegration. 
There is no reason to suppose that the nation-building and state-making civil 
and military ~lite of the infant republic did not face the same constraints which 
the reforming young Turk ~lite of the Ottoman centre did. After all, there was 
continuity not only in the way social change--WesternisationEand the 
obstructionist role of religion were conceived by the Young Turks and Kemal 
Atatiirk, founder of the republic; but also in the way Islam challenged the 
secularist moments and movements by rallying discontent and opposition to the 
state around itself. Thus, despite the secularisation of state, came the 
establishment of an official religious establishment in the form of a subordinate 
government agency, for achieving what the Ottoman state sought to achieve: the 
integration of Islam under the wings of the strong state so as to control it. 
What factors were instrumental in making this control over religion 
indispensable, despite the break with the Ottoman state on the shari'a basis of 
state? The answer must also partly lie within the nature of this rupture with the 
past, which consisted of two gigantic packages. The first was a cultural project 
concentrating intensively on the micro parameters on the level of the attitude of 
the individual. It was hoped that by secularisation, religion would not be 
compromised at the everyday level, and thus the individual would be relieved of 
the oppressive constraints of Islam-as-culture in his own home and community, 
turning into a new man type, 3 conducive to sustaining the new goal of the state: 
modernisation on westernised lines. Here, one can easily detect the same old fear 
of folk Islam organised around a multiplicity of orders, sects, cults, sheikhs and 
what not, posing a mentality threat to the young republic. The second radical 
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rupture with the past was composed of three dimensions, all political in nature: 
nation-building, state-formation and political consolidation. In the attainment 
of all these three tasks, the official ideology of the republic, called Kemalism, 
continued to manifest the elements of the authoritarian traditional culture of the 
Ottomans in that it took the sole initiative in dominating, structuring and 
organising sources of national identity, social cohesion, political unity and state 
structure, admittedly along a westernisation model. 
Let us look at this political package more closely. In establishing secularism as 
the pillar of the cultural and political transformation of the society, the Kemalist 
61ite had the sole power of designing, redefining and superseding all the elements 
which represented a threat to the three tasks listed above. In other words, the 
State would overwhelm anything that stood on its way to nation-building, state- 
formation and establishing its political hegemony over the populace. The divisive 
potential of social class, religion, sectarianism and ethnicity were to be ruled out, 
by setting up a corporate society based on a system of close vigilance by the state, 
rather than by following a policy of accommodation. 
At the time of the founding of the republic, none of these public enemy social 
actors however, posed as powerful a threat as religion. Secularisation involved a 
headlong clash with the very raison d'etre of Islam which claimed superiority in 
forming and sustaining a state on Islamic maxims. Now, the basis of legitimacy of 
political power was shifted from Islam to electoral mechanisms, which would 
later, in a more competitive period, turn into a more developed concept of 
popular sovereignty. It is only through this tenuous link that Turkish secularism 
became a codeword for democratisation. However, the precariousness of this 
link was soon proven by the looming problem of political consolidation which 
necessitated controlling, structuring and co-opting the traditional elements on 
the periphery entering into the political system via the formula of universal 
suffrage. 
In the formative years of the republic, and for that matter, for years to come, 
the new Turkish state therefore, both controlled and co-opted and at the same 
time set the tone of the religious dissidence. While the moral outrage in the 
countryside to the twofold package of cultural Westernisation and political 
integration produced the conditions conducive to anti-secular movements, 4 the 
Ankara government, under the influence of the accumulated wisdom of the 
Ottoman experience took its guard: in the name of secularisation, it created a 
state department which enabled it to have a say in religious affairs without itself 
making any attempt to create a new version of Islam. The strange and unique 
features of institutionalising Islam in a predominantly Muslim society were 
reflected in the state 61ite not intending to separate the temporal and spiritual 
realms the way the Biblical maxim put it: 'render unto Ceasar that which belongs 
to Ceasar, and unto God that which belongs to God'. 
RELIGION AND STATE IN THE MULTI-PARTY PERIOD: 
THE ELECTORAL CONSTRAINTS OF THE 1950s 
The success record of Turkish secularism, in the mono-party period, in 
excluding Islam from the political sphere and from undermining the 
Westernisation process in the political sphere is impressive) So much so that the 
Volume 20, Nos 4-6, February 1995 
754 Omit Cizre-Sakallio~lu 
political opposition on the periphery, taking the form of religious rebellions, had 
neither the vision, nor the power to organise an effect assault on Kemalist 
secularism. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the changing balance of 
social forces within the country and also in the Western bloc hastened the 
introduction of competitive party politics. In 1950, a new political party on the 
centre right spectrum, the Democrat Party (DP), claiming to represent the 
periphery was elected to power and stayed there until overthrown by the military 
coup of 1960. When the overall record of the party on the issue of religion is set 
against the achievements of the previous era, it can easily be asserted that since in 
major ways the DP shared the same commitment with the Kemalist state elite to 
modernisation via the secular route, the civil-military bureaucracy continued to 
keep a tight rein over religion. This is so, despite the fact that for more 
instrumental than ideological reasons, the party set the precedence for Turkish 
political parties to mobilise the religiosity of the rural voters for political gain. 
This is also what forms the basis of the claim made by some Western observers 
that the 1950s are to be characterised as a decade of religious revival and 
resurgence. 6 However, DP's promotion of religion for electoral success was due 
to the necessities of party politicking under the conditions of the 1950s: lacking a 
previously cultivated power base at the grass roots, or in the bureaucracy by 
patron-client network, it is not surprising that the DP discovered religion and 
employed it. 
THE 1970s: THE STATE AND THE COURSE AND DISCOURSE 
OF RELIGION 
In many ways, the first military coup of the Turkish republic in 1960, 
represents a watershed on the Turkish political landscape, particularly for Islam. 
In the more liberal and pluralist orientation of the era, and under the impact of 
the exceptionally rapid socio-economic modernisation of the 1960s, the old 
cultural cleavage between the state and society turned into a left-right division 
with fragmentation and radicalism in each camp leading to political violence and 
the collapse of the political system. The first pro-Islamic party of the period, the 
National Salvation Party (NSP), was formed in this more permissive and 
democratic climate, and became a key coalition partner between 1974 and 1977, 
despite its known espousal of anti-Kemalist and anti-systemic tendencies. 
The emergence and the operations of the NSP reaffirms, rather than 
invalidates, our basic proposition that it has always been the state which has 
steered the political course and the discourse of religion as an oppositional force. 
The civil-military bureaucracy, with their self-defined role as the guardians of 
the public interest, though disliking the NSP, were not unduly alarmed by the 
activities of it, as long as the party did what it had been doing: officially 
supported secularism, paid homage to the principles of parliamentary 
democracy and political pluralism, and did not get involved in political violence. 
This tacit pact suited the NSP much more than the secular 61ite, since it based its 
strategy not on short-term electoral gains but on the long-term goal of promoting 
the role and relevance of Islam in Turkish politics. The precondition to do this 
was to wage the struggle from within the secular state, from a legitimate place and 
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through a legitimate form of  organisation, a modern political party. In any case, 
unofficially, the party adopted an opposite discourse to the one it employed in 
front of the Kemalist public. 
On another level too, the rise, the social base and the programmatic vision of 
the party emphasised the determining role of the state. The standard argument 
explaining the political fortunes of the party links it with the dislocations caused 
by the unevenness of capitalist development and thus classifies it as a typical 
example of Islam-as-a-rallying-platform-of-discontent for those small traders 
and artisans who do not get full benefits from capitalism. Despite the element of 
truth in it, this view point must be complemented by another one: the NSP can be 
interpreted as a clear sign of the success of the Kemalist drive for a modern and 
secular education system which was responsible for the creation of very many 
aspirations unmet by prayers and rituals. As an Islamist party, born into the age 
of modernisation and welfare capitalism, it is not surprising therefore that the 
party articulated a double discourse: 7 with its advocacy of a return to strict 
Islamic polity in terms of moral and religious values, it appealed to the 
traditional elements; whereas with its pro-industrialisation and pro-technology 
bias it opened its doors to the 'modern'  aspirations of Islamists educated in 
secular institutions, thus proving itself capable of rethinking modernity in the 
light of Islamic maxims, a process, definitely taken up and elaborated further by 
the upcoming radical Islam. 
THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE STATE TO THE DESTABILISING 
EFFECT OF ISLAM IN THE POST-1980s 
The tide of Islamic extremism in the post-1980 era should be seen neither as a 
pure revival nor a simple continuity of Islam in accordance with the precedence 
set by the 1950s and then the 1970s; since no degree of accumulated grievances by 
which the past two waves are explained, can provide the present momentum for 
the movement. Nor is this a replica of what is happening elsewhere in the Muslim 
world. It is our proposition that the vigour and the dynamism of the movement, 
once more, owes more to the actions and doings of the post-1980 state than to the 
seeds sown in the past. 
There are at least three fundamental reasons that were instrumental in the 
promotion of the Islam factor by the state 61ite, both during the military 
(1980-1983), and the subsequent period of civilian rule. To begin with, the near 
civil-war situation of the country on the eve of the 1980 coup convinced the 
military and its civilian allies that the failure of political pluralism reaffirmed 
their belief that the communist menace was a thousand times worse than 
religious obstructionism and reaction. Thus came the policy of reconciliation, 
recognition and tolerance towards religion in order for it to act as a bulwark 
against communism. Secondly, the post-1980 period was also a serious phase of 
transition from republic-old etatist economic development model to a liberal 
economy one. One political condition for the success of the bitter medicine made 
necessary by the structural adjustment of the Turkish economy was the creation 
of a socially disciplined and thus politically-stable society where the people 
would bear the sacrifices needed to uphold a free-market oriented economy. 
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Islam was therefore utilised by the state 61ite to dampen the explosive impact of 
competitive capitalism. 
Last, but by no means the least, the articulation of Islam into the Kemalist 
discourse was, in part, due to the rising crest of religion as a viable ideology all 
around the Middle East, even in the Far East, and among the Muslim residents in 
the West. Faced with this reality, the state 61ite tried to pre-empt this spreading 
radicalism by emphasising their own commitment to religious orthodoxy, 
thereby missing the crucial point that the Islam they were dealing with was 
neither the mild Islam prevalent among the masses, nor controllable like the 
NSP's. 
To sum up, due to its strong state tradition, the Turkish state has achieved 
producing two antithetical developments: it has subordinated and marginalised 
religion in the political sphere, and thus caused it to act as a destabilising force. 
Nevertheless, the state has shown a remarkable capacity and effectiveness in 
containing, manipulating, or if the worst comes, co-habiting with Islam, which 
not only distinguishes her from the neighbouring Middle Eastern States but also 
provides fresh hopes for the future fate of the secular republic. 
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